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STRAHAN v. LINNON
A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR TESTING THE USE
OF SECTION 7(a)(1) AS AN ACTION-FORCING
PROVISION
Amber Shell Ward*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1997 decision, Strahan v. Linnon,' the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts summarily rejected the claims of
Max Strahan, a whale enthusiast and citizen activist. Following two
occasions upon which a United States Coast Guard vessel struck and killed
an endangered Northern Right whale,' Strahan brought numerous claims,
alleging various violations under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and
other relevant environmental statutes. The defendants, namely the United
States Coast Guard and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
were granted summary judgment on every count. Although the court's
decision was reasonable in light of applicable case and statutory law, its
inability to find any material issue of fact was perhaps unduly harsh.
Strahan generally attacked the results of the ESA's section 7 consulta-
tion process, and the defendants' dilatory, but on-going compliance efforts.
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1999.
1. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1997).
2. On July 6, 1991, the Coast Guard Cutter Chase, struck and killed a Northern Right
whale calf off the Delaware coast. On January 5, 1993, the Cutter Point Francis, allegedly
traveling at full speed, also struck and killed a Right whale calf. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F.
Supp. 581, app. 612. In its defense, the Coast Guard stated that its vessels do not have the
technical capability to determine when protected marine mammals are present. Instead, the
Coast Guard must rely on physical observation. Id. at 588 (Note: The appendix of 967 F.
Supp. pages 609-632 contains a "Memorandum and Order" issued by the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts on May 2, 1995. The case which is the
subject of this note is reported on pages 581-609. Future cites to the 1995 Memorandum
will be denoted by "app.").
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The thrust of his grievance was that the defendants failed to adequately
insure that the Northern Right whale will not be further jeopardized by the
actions and inaction of the defendants.3 Due deference and findings of
'sufficiency' and 'adequacy' prevailed in the court's checklist of summary
judgments. The court repeatedly offered less than effective arguments in
support of its rulings. Departing somewhat from its stronger stance in the
original suit, the court did not include any forceful language in its rulings
and appeared content to leave matters to the discretion of the defendants.
Rather than seizing an ample opportunity to flex the substantive might
of the ESA conservation mandates, the court effectively relegated the
statute to a series of procedural obstacles. The following discussion will
focus on the court's handling of the ESA claims and will examine the
potential of section 7(a)( 1)4 as a strong mechanism for promoting species
conservation and enforcing species recovery planning.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) ' contains a variety of
protections designed to save from extinction species that the Secretary of
the Interior has designated as threatened or endangered.6 The Act outlines
the major procedural requirements and the corresponding regulations
provide further procedural and substantive guidance.7 Whenever a federal
agency proposes to undertake an action that may affect an endangered
species, section 7 of the Act prescribes a three step process which includes
an initial screening to determine if an endangered species "may be present,"
and a biological assessment to determine if the species is likely to be
3. Id. at 589.
4. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994). All
in-text references to provisions of the ESA in this Note will cite to the section number of the
Act and not the United States Code, as is customary in cases and commentaries on this topic.
5. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1544 (1994)).
6. The Endangered Species Act, § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to declare a species "endangered." In its application, the Act, in using the term
"Secretary," is referring to the service within either the Department of Commerce or the
Department of the Interior that is responsible for implementing the policies of the ESA. The
Endangered Species Act § 3(15), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994).
7. See 50 C.F.R. § 402 (1998).
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affected.' If these determinations are both affirmative, section 7(a)(1)
requires that all federal agencies "shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of
purposes of [the Act] by carrying out programs for the conservation of
endangered species and threatened species .... 9
Section 7(a)(2) requires federal agencies to insure that any action it
authorizes is "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species.., or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of habitat of such species.""° In order to fulfill this latter requirement, the
responsible agency, either the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the
National MarineFisheries Service (NMFS), must issue abiological opinion
stating its view as to whether the proposed action will have the likely effect
of jeopardizing the continued existence of the species."
Section 4(f) mandates that the responsible service "shall develop and
implement plans for the conservation and survival of endangered species
8. The Endangered Species Act, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3) (1994). In this case the
Secretary of Commerce had the primary responsibility for enforcing the ESA through the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the agency within the Department of Commerce
responsible for marine wildlife and habitat. Id. § 1532(15). Secretary of the Interior, acting
through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), shares responsibilities with NMFS under
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1362(12), 1377(1994), and the
ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(15), 1540(e)(1) (1994). NMFS is responsible for whales, dolphins,
seals, and sea lions. See Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F.Supp. 963, 971 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing 54
Fed. Reg. 40,338 (1989)).
9. The Endangered Species Act, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994). A "biological
assessment" contains information concerning the endangered species and its habitat, and
evaluates the potential effect or modification of habitat that the proposed action may have.
See The Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)-(4) (1994), 50 C.F.R. §
402.02 (1998).
10. Id. § 7(a)(2).
11. Id. § 7(b)(3)(A). An action jeopardizes the continued existence of a species if it
"reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood
of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction,
numbers, or distribution of that species." Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept.
of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9t' Cir. 1990) (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1988)).
Substantial discretion is afforded to the agencies as to the content and scope of the biological
opinion, even when an agency's biological opinion is based on "admittedly weak"
information. Id. at 1415 (citing Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1459-60 (90 Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985)). By complying with the reasonable and prudent
alternatives spelled out in a biological opinion, an agency can typically avoid a judicial
determination that it has placed a protected species in jeopardy, unless the decision to
implement the biological opinion was arbitrary or capricious. Id.
1999]
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and threatened species. .,, ."2 This requires identification of management
actions necessary to achieve the plan's recovery goals.' 3 Recovery plans,
as they are known, must, "to the maximum extent practicable," include a
description of site-specific management actions, and objective, measurable
criteria which, when satisfied, will result in delisting of the species.
4
Arguably the most powerful provision of the Act, section 9 makes it
unlawful for any "person," including a federal agency, 5 to "take" any
endangered species. 6 The term "take" is defined as "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in
any such conduct."' 7 Although "harm" is not defined in the statute, the
Secretary has defined it to mean "an act or omission which actually injures
or kills wildlife, including acts which may annoy it to such an extent as to
significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns." 8 An agency is only
permitted to "take" a protected species if it has obtained an "incidental
taking" permit or statement.' 9 The fact that the ESA allows for the issuance
of incidental take permits for instances where a taking is "incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity"
12. The Endangered Species Act § 4(f)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(1) (1994).
13. Id. § 4(f)(1)(B), § 1533(f)(1)(B). The ESA requires that the NMFS consider the
particular needs of ecosystems occupied by protected species. Id. § 4(f)(1)(A). In desi-
gnating objective, measurable criteria for a recovery plan, the NMFS must address each of
the five statutory delisting factors and measure whether threats to protected whales had been
ameliorated; it is insufficient that recovery plan's criteria would "likely lead" to a finding
that the statutory delisting factors were met. See id. § 4(a)-(c),(f)(1)(B)(ii). See also Fund
for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 111 (D.D.C. 1995).
14. The Endangered Species Act, § 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994).
15. Id. § 3(13), § 1532(13) (1994).
16. Id. § 9(a)(1)(B), § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994).
17. Id. § 3(19), § 1532(19) (1994). In Strahan v. Coxe, a recent, unrelated suit brought
by Strahan, this court determined that "[tihe term 'take' is to be construed liberally [and]
should be defined in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in
which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F.
Supp. 963, 983 (D. Mass. 1996). The regulations define the term "harass" to mean "an
intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which
include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c) (1998).
18. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c) (1998).
19. The Endangered Species Act § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994). An
agency may apply for an incidental take permit when it submits its conservation plan, or may
obtain permission to take an endangered species at the completion of the section 7
consultation process through an incidental take "statement." Id. §§ 10(a)(2), 7(b)(4), 16
U.S.C. §§ 1539(a)(2), 1536(b)(4). See also Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F.Supp. 581, app. 624
(D. Mass. 1997).
indicates that Congress intended section 9 to prohibit indirect as well as
deliberate takings.20
B. The Marine Mammal Protection Act
For over twenty years, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972
(MMPA)2' has been protecting various species of marine mammals from
harm caused by human activity.' Section 115b of the MMPA requires that
the NMFS prepare plans for the conservation and survival of listed
species.' The Secretary is directed to "act expeditiously to implement each
conservation plan."'
The MMPA also establishes a moratorium on the "taking" of marine
mammals and marine products.' "Take" is defined to mean "harass, hunt,
capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine
mammal."' In the corresponding regulations, "take" is defined to include
"the negligent or intentional operation of an aircraft or vessel, or the doing
of any other negligent or intentional act which results in disturbing or
molesting a marine mammal."' 7 Similar to the ESA, the MMPA contains
a statutory exception for incidental takings.' The MMPA exception
provides that for activities other than commercial fishing, the Secretary
shall, upon request, allow the incidental taking of "small numbers of marine
20. The Endangered Species Act § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994).
21. Pub. L. 92-522 § 2, Oct. 21, 1972 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-
1421(h) (1994)).
22. See generally Susan C. Alker, The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing
the Approach to Conservation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 527 (1996) (discussing the history of the
MMPA).
23. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, § 115b(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1383b
(1994). All other in text references to provisions of the MMPA in this Note cite to the
appropriate section of the United States Code.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1383b(b)(3) (1994). A recovery plan prepared under section 4(f) of
the ESA is synonymous with and fulfills the requirement for a conservation plan under
section 115b(b) of the MMPA. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 599 n.23 (D. Mass.
1997).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1994). The MMPA prohibits the taking of any endangered
marine mammals for non-scientific purposes. Id § 1371(a)(3)(B) (1994).
26. Id. § 1362(13) (1994), see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167,
170 (D.D.C. 1977).
27. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1998).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A) (1994).
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mammuals" if the total number of incidental takes will have a "negligible
impact" on the species or stock.29
C. The Administrative Procedure Act
When a court reviews actions taken by an agency pursuant to the ESA,
MMPA, or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), it must apply
the standards set forth in the judicial review provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA).30 The proper standard of review is whether the
agency's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law. '31 This is a very narrow scope of
review, limited only to the administrative record already in existence at the
time of the initial agency decision.32 Certain exceptions to this rule exist
that allow a court to consider evidence outside the administrative record.
One such exception can be made when the court finds that new or addi-
tional evidence has been produced that the agency should have considered,
but failed to do so. 33 It is left entirely within the discretion of the court to
decide whether or not to consider any additional evidence.'
29. Id. These permits may only be issued for a period of five years or less. Id.
30. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994), see also Strahan v. Linnon, 966 F. Supp. 111, 114
(D. Mass. 1997) (order granting Strahan permission to supplement the administrative record
with evidence concerning information which the government failed to consider). See also
Bay's Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F. Supp. 102, 107 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that federal
authorization of construction of effluent discharge tunnel did not violate federal environmen-
tal laws); and see also Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 981-82 (9 1
Cir. 1985) (standard of review for administrative actions concerning the ESA is the arbitrary
or capricious standard).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
32. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142(1973). The court must uphold the administrative
action if the agency "considered all relevant factors and articulated a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made." See also Friends of Endangered Species v.
Jantzen, 760 F.2d. at 982 (citing Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983)).
33. Conservation Law Foundation of New England v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1475
(D. Mass. 1984).
34. Strahan v. Linnon, 966 F. Supp. at 114 (D. Mass. 1997).
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III. STRAHAN V. LINNON
A. Facts and Procedure
The dispute in Strahan v. Linnon5 arose largely in response to two
occasions in which a Coast Guard vessel struck and killed a Northern Right
whale calf.36 In 1994, plaintiff Max Strahan filed a complaint pro se
against two Admirals of the United States Coast Guard,37 alleging various
violations of the ESA, MMPA, APA, and NEPA.38 Strahan, an officer of
Green World, Inc., filed the original complaint "on behalf of' the Northern
Right whale, the Humpback whale, the Fin whale, the Sei whale, the Blue
whale, and the Minke whale.39 Relying on a prior decision, the court
determined that Strahan could not bring suit "on behalf of' the whales
because the whales, even if directly injured by the Coast Guard's activities,
are animals and therefore lack standing to sue.' The court established that
Strahan had to show the Coast Guard's actions in fact harmed the whales
and that, apart from his interest as a dedicated advocate, he is "directly
35. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1997).
36. kIL at 588.
37. The defendants were RearAdmiral John L. Linnon andAdmiral RobertE. Kramek.
Id.
38. Id. at 587.
39. Id. at app. 610. All but the Minke have been listed as endangered under the ESA,
but the focus of the complaint is on the Northern Right whale. See id. (citing the Final Rule
of the NMFS designating a critical habitat for the Northern Right whale. 59 Fed. Reg.
28,793(1994)). Northern Right whales are the most endangered of the large whales, despite
the fact that they have been federally protected from commercial whaling since 1935.
Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963,968 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 28,793(1994)).
Less than approximately 350 individual Right whales exist in the North Atlantic, and the
population is feared to be near extinction. Id. Approximately half of all known Right whale
calves in the North Atlantic use Massachusetts waters sometime during their first year of life.
Id. (citing Right Whales in Massachusetts Waters, An Executive Summary, TRO Ex. 6 at 2).
In 1994, the NMFS designated a critical habitat for the Northern Right whale in sections
of Cape Cod Bay, the Stellwagen Bank, the Great South Channel and the southeastern
United States. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at app. 611 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 28,793,
28,797-98(1994)). Humpback whales are believed to be the fourth most numerically
depleted large whale world-wide. Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. at 969. The Northern Right,
Humpback, Fin or Finback, Blue, and Sei whales have all been listed as endangered species
by the federal government. See 50 C.F.R. § 222.23(a) (1998).
40. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, app. 616 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing Citizens to
End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45,49-50
(D. Mass. 1993)).
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affected" by any harm to the whales.4' Strahan met this requirement by
showing that the Coast Guard's activities would decrease the number of
whales that he may observe and study.4
The following year, the district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants on several counts, but granted, in part, Strahan' s motion for
a preliminary injunction, requiring that the Coast Guard promptly fulfill the
procedural requirements of the ESA, vMPA and NEPA.43 The decree
issued by the district court in 1995 described the Coast Guard's inaction as
"deleteriousness and neglect."44 The defendants did not initiate formal
procedures to address the impact of its activities on endangered marine
mammals until after Strahan filed the original complaint. Consequently,
the court found a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Coast
Guard vessels will in the future "take" more Northern Right whales in
violation of the ESA.45
Pursuant to the court's 1995 order, the Coast Guard submitted a
biological assessment to the NMFS.4 In its biological assessment, analyz-
ing the impact of vessel operations, the Coast Guard recognized that the
primary danger to whales from search and rescue operations is collision
with vessels while the mammals are on the ocean surface and that because
Northern Right whales typically feed and calf close to the ocean surface,
they are most in danger of vessel strikes. 47 Despite this finding, the Coast
Guard asserted that the potential for collisions and other adverse impact on
the species remains small. In its responding biological opinion, the NMFS
concluded that long-term continuation of Coast Guard activities 4 "may
adversely affect, but is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
populations of endangered" whales. The opinion also stated that in the
event an endangered whale was injured or struck by a Coast Guard vessel,
41. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at app. 617.
42. Id.
43. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581. Summary judgment is appropriate for
resolving a challenge to an agency's decision when review is based upon the administrative
record. See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C. 1995).
44. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at app. 610.
45. Id. at app. 625.
46. Id. at 581,588.
47. Id. at app. 613-614 (citing the ESA Biological Assessment for the U.S. Atlantic
Coast (Mar. 29,1995) at B-2).
48. Operating under the Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard performs
extensive marine operations, including rescues at sea, navigation assistance, immigration
enforcement and drug enforcement. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at app. 611.
consultation would have to be reinitiated.49 Statistical evidence from the
NMFS demonstrates that Coast Guard activities have in fact caused harm
to whales.50
Less than one month after the biological opinion was issued, a Coast
Guard vessel struck a Humpback whale." The Whale Protection Program
guidelines,52 which were applicable to Coast Guard operations, were
apparently not effective in fulfilling their purpose. Also at this time, the
Northern Right whale population was experiencing an increased number of
mortalities.53 In light of these developments, the second biological opinion,
issued in July of 1996, concluded that continued Coast Guard activities
"may result in serious injury or mortality to the northern right whale, and
... are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the species. 54 In its
opinion the NMFS also proposed a reasonable and prudent alternative, as
required under the regulations implementing section 7 of the ESA, conclud-
ing that implementation of the alternative was necessary to ensure that
Coast Guard vessel operations avoid striking whales to the maximum extent
49. L at 40, see also Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 588.
50. The NMFS has recognized that vessel traffic may subject whales to impacts ranging
from displacing cow-calf pairs from near-shore waters, to expending increased energy when
feeding is disrupted or migratory paths rerouted. Approaching Marine Mammals, 57 Fed.
Reg. 34,101 (1992). Specifically, vessel activities have the potential to "change whale
behavior, disrupt feeding practices, disturb courtship rituals, disperse food sources and injure
or kill whales through collisions." Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at app. 610-611 (citing
59 Fed. Reg. 28,796 (1994)). One set of statistics reports that as much as 11% of identified
Northern Right whales were found to have propeller scars from large vessels, and it has been
documented that nearly 30% of Right whale mortalities are the result of collisions with
vessels. Id. at app. 611.
51. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581,589 (D. Mass. 1997).
52. In 1994, the First Coast Guard District, covering coastal New England, New York
and portions of New Jersey, adopted a Whale Protection Program ("Marine Mammal and
Endangered Species Protection Program") which, in part, established guidelines for the
operation of Coast Guard vessels. It requires that all vessels navigating through Northern
Right whale critical habitat areas "use caution and be alert for whales." In addition, the
guidelines outline specific procedures to follow once a whale has been sighted. Strahan v.
Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at app. at 612 (citing the ESA Biological Assessment for the U.S.
Atlantic Coast (Mar. 29, 1995) at 4-2).
53. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 589.
54. NATIONALMARINE FISHERIES SERvIcE, ENDANGERED SPEcIEs Acr-SETION 7
CONSULTATION, BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR REINITIATION OF CONSULTATION ON UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD VEssaLs AND AIRCRAFr ALONG THE ATLANTIC COAST, 24 (July 22,
1996). In its second biological opinion, the N1VIFS concluded that "[i]t is likely that the new
population estimate will show a declining, rather than a stable population." Id.
3191999] Strahan v. Linnon
320 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:311
possible." In its Final Environmental Impact Statement, the Coast Guard
stated that "adoption and implementation" of the Atlantic Protected Living
Marine Resources (APLMR) Initiative was the Preferred Alternative. 6 The
APLMR included an Internal Program and a Conservation Program, to
accomplish its missions, including protection of the environment, while
also fulfilling its obligations to protected listed species."
Unsatisfied with these conservation efforts, Strahan filed an amended
complaint containing over twenty counts, claiming that the defendants had
violated provisions of the ESA, MMPA, NEPA and APA by inadequately
addressing the impact of Coast Guard activities on endangered whale
species and by failing to insure that Northern Right whale populations will
not be furtherjeopardized.5 Strahan also sought declaratory judgment that
the "takings" of three endangered whales constituted a violation of
MMPA. 59 In a separate proceeding, the court allowed Strahan to supple-
ment the administrative record, to a limited extent, with evidence regarding
information that the agency improperly failed to consider, as well as
information to aid the court's comprehension of technical aspects of the
defendants' activities concerning implementation of recovery plans.6 In
response, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all
55. Id. at 26.
56. U.S. COASTGUARD AND BATTELLE OCEAN SCIENCES, NEPA FINAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT FORTHE U.S. COAST GUARD ATLANTIC PROTECTED LIVING MARINE
RESOURCES (APLMR) INITIATIVE (Oct. 31, 1996) (emphasis added); see also Strahan v.
Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 589. The APLMR focuses on operating procedures and directives
for [Coast Guard] vessels and aircraft in the Atlantic area that would "prevent, to the
maximum extent possible, harmful interactions with protected living marine resources."
U.S. COAST GUARD & BATrELLE OCEAN SCIENCES, supra, at iv (Oct. 31, 1996). Other
efforts by the NMFS include the establishment of the Large Whale Take Reduction Team,
pursuant to the MMPA, which prepared a Take Reduction Plan. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F.
Supp. at 589. See also The Endangered Species Act § 3(24), (25), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1632(24),
(25), 1387 (1994). Most recently, the NMFS issued an interim final rule restricting
approaches within 500 yards of Northern Right whales. North Atlantic Right Whale
Protection, 62 Fed. Reg. 6729 (Feb. 13, 1997).
57. U.S. COAST GUARD & BATTELLE OCEAN SCIENCES, supra note 56, at iii (Oct. 31,
1996).
58. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 589.
59. Id. at 600.
60. Strahan v. Linnon, 966 F. Supp. 111 (D. Mass. 1997). Strahan was not allowed to
supplement the administrative record with evidence concerning the size of the population,
photographs of interactions between humans and whales, timing of development of recovery
plans for listed whale species, and circumstances surrounding the 1995 incident in which a
Coast Guard vessel struck a Humpback whale. Id.
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counts, arguing that they had fulfilled the consultation and conservation
requirements which would adequately protect the endangered whale
populations.6'
The district court fully granted the defendants motion for summary
judgment and denied Strahan's motion for partial summary judgment.
Specifically, the court found that the APLMR Initiative sufficiently reduces
the risk of harm to endangered marine mammals and that Strahan failed to
establish that future harm to the species would actually occur.62 The court
also noted that the defendants "must remain vigilant in their protection of
the species" because the conservation mandates under the ESA impose a
continuing responsibility which did not cease at the close of the litigation.63
B. Arguments Presented
Among the numerous counts brought by Strahan were several allega-
tions of ESA violations, including a challenge to the adequacy of the
NMFS Biological Opinion.' Strahan claimed that the biological opinion
failed to sufficiently evaluate the cumulative effects of the Coast Guard's
activities' and that the NMFS did not use the best scientific and commer-
cial data.' Finding no merit in Strahan's claim of inadequacy, the court
ruled that the biological opinion was sufficient because it contained a
discussion of the impact of non-Coast Guard vessels on the Northern Right
whale and because the NMFS used the best scientific and commercial data
available.67 The court employed a similar, but less stringent analysis of the
61. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 589.
62. IML at 608.
63. Id.
64. Strahan could not challenge the adequacy of the Biological Opinion under the
ESA's citizen suit provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(c)(1994), because it only authorizes
suits against the Secretary which seek to compel him to perform a nondiscriminatory duty.
Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 592. However, the suit can be brought under the APA
provision which provides for the right to judicial review of all final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court of law. Id.
65. "Cumulative effects" are defined as"those effects of future State or private activities
... that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area of the Federal action subject
to consultation." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1998).
66. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 594.
67. Id. Although the NMFS did not perform a population viability analysis or model
the effects of interactions between whales and vessels, the court found that these alleged
deficiencies were not sufficient to satisfy the applicable "arbitrary or capricious" standard
of the APA. Id. See also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 898
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Coast Guard's Biological Assessment, the sufficiency of which Strahan
also challenged.68 The primary difference between a biological opinion and
a biological assessment is that the contents of the biological assessment are
discretionary and depend on the nature of the Federal action.69 Strahan's
claims again failed to meet the arbitrary and capricious standard and the
court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
Challenging the defendants' duty under section 4(f), Strahan claimed
that the NMFS's failure to "develop and implement plans for the conserva-
tion and survival of 'endangered species' constituted a violation of the
ESA.71 In response to Strahan's claim that the Coast Guard's failure to
develop plans for the conservation and survival of whales other than
Northern Right and Humpbacks was a violation of the ESA, the defendants
successfully argued that the ESA imposes no time limits for implementa-
tion of recovery plans.7 2 The court ruled that the fact that the NMFS has
not issued recovery plans for Sei, Blue and Fin whales does not constitute
a violation of section 4(f) of the ESA, and that the NMFS is required only
to report to Congress on the status of its efforts to develop and implement
recovery plans. 3
More importantly, although the recovery plan for Northern Right
whales and Humpback whales is not yet implemented, the court ruled that
since the NMFS is making progress towards implementation of the recov-
ery plan, no ESA violation exists.74 Attacking the sufficiency of the plan,
Strahan also claimed the APLMR Initiative was not an adequate conserva-
tion program in that it did not contain specific measures necessary to
F.2d 1410, 1414 (9' Cir. 1990).
68. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 594.
69. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (1998), see also Bay's Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F. Supp.
102, 110 n.19 (D. Mass. 1993).
70. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 594.
71. Id. at 596. Because a section 4(f) recovery plan is synonymous with an MMPA
section 115(b) conservation plan, the court considered the claims concerning these plans
together. Id. at 599 n.23.
72. "[There is no statutory time limit within which the Secretary is required to develop
and publish a recovery plan." Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Turner, 863 F. Supp.
1277, 1282-83 (D. Or. 1994). Also, the Secretary is authorized to establish a priority system
in developing recovery plans, allocating resources to those species that will most likely
benefit from development of a recovery plan. Id. at 1282. See also The Endangered Species
Act § 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994).
73. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 597; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994).
74. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 597.
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prevent further loss of the endangered whales.75 Specifically, Strahan
claims that the recovery plan is insufficient because it fails to include
annual census population viability and analysis, interim numerical goals,
and speed limits or distance rules for non-Coast Guard vessels.76
The court found that this was not a "fatal flaw" and that the Secretary
is to be afforded discretion in determining the best means to meet the
mandate of section 7(a)(1).' The ESA provides that recovery plans must,
"to the maximum extent practicable" identify site-specific management
actions necessary to achieve conservation and survival of protected
species.7' A plan which "fails to recommend corrective action or explain
why itis impracticable or unnecessary to recommend such action would not
meet the ESA's standard. Nor would a plan that completely ignores threats
to conservation and survival of a species." '79 Because courts generally
afford an agency's decision a great deal of deference in instances when
expert, scientific determinations are involved,"0 Strahan would have had to
show that the alleged deficiencies were "necessary to achieve the plan's
goal for the conservation and survival of the species."' Incidentally, the
NMFS is currently implementing some of the measures suggested by
Strahan in his complaint. 2
Strahan brought "takings"claims under both the ESA and the MMPA. 3
The court expressly stated that there was "no dispute" that Coast Guard
75. Id. at 595-96.
76. 11 at 597.
77. Id. at 596.
78. The Endangered Species Act § 4(f)(1)(B)(i). See also Fund for Animals v. Babbitt,
903 F. Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C. 1995).
79. Id at 108.
80. See Bay's Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F. Supp. 102, 107 (D. Mass. 1993)
("[W]here there is a factual dispute involving issues of science, which implicates substantial
agency expertise, deference is owed to the informed decision making of the responsible
agency.").
81. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 598. (quoting The Endangered Species Act §
4(f)(1)(B)(i), 16 U.S.C.§ 1533(f)(1)(B)(i) (1994)). In a rather unusual gesture, the court
found suggestions made by one of Strahan's scientists "particularly compelling," and noted
that the NMFS would be "well advised" to consider his proposals. Strahan v. Linnon, 967
F. Supp. at 598 n.21 (commenting on Dr. Stevenson's suggestions for a statistically-designed
plan to monitor population trends).
82. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 598.
83. Id. at 599. The takings claims were divided into two categories: "takings" by Coast
Guard vessels and "takings" by non-Coast Guard vessels which have been issued Certificates
of Documentation by the Coast Guard. ld. See also The Endangered Species Act § 9(a), 16
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1994); 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1)(1994.).
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vessels have "taken" three endangered whales in the last seven years.84
Strahan sought declaratory judgment "that taking of Federally Protected
Whales by the Coast Guard in the course of their operation of vessels on
the marine waters of the [sic] United States without any 'small take permit'
to do so... constitutes an illegal taking of the Northern Right Whale and
other Federally Protected Whales and is in violation of the prohibitions of
the MMPA." 5 However, because the Coast Guard concedes that it violated
the ESA and MMPA by taking three endangered whales, the court reasoned
that such a declaration would be superfluous.8 6 The court further ruled that
injunctive relief was not warranted because future takings would be
unlikely.8 7 The First Circuit's standard for injunctive relief is whether
"petitioners have shown that the alleged activity has actually harmed the
species or if continued will actually, as opposed to potentially, cause harm
to the species. '8 Despite the Coast Guard's admission that if its past
practices were to continue, evidence presented by Strahan would be
sufficient to satisfy the standard for injunctive relief, summary judgment
was granted to the defendants.8 9
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Court Declined to Enforce Implementation of the Recovery Plan
Formally adopted by the Coast Guard in December of 1996 as the
preferred alternative,9° the APLMR Initiative was not yet fully imple-
mented by the defendants as of the issuance of the court's opinion. 91 The
specific mandate of the ESA is development and implementation of a
recovery plan.92 However, the court effectively ruled that progress toward
implementation was sufficient to fulfill the mandate of section 7(a)(1). 93
84. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 600.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 166 (1V Cir. 1993). See also Strahan
v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 986 (D. Mass. 1996).
89. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 600.
90. Id. at 589.
91. Id. at 599.
92. The Endangered Species Act § 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(t) (1994).
93. See Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 595-96. The court reasoned that "[a]n
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Although this ruling is reasonable in light of statutory and case law, court-
ordered implementation of the recovery plan may have better served the
goal and spirit of the ESA.
Assuming that the recovery plan was substantively sufficient, Strahan
was still unable to persuade the court that failure to implement the plan
constituted a violation of the ESA. The court allowed progress in imple-
mentation to suffice. 4 The decision undercut the jeopardy prohibition95
and replaced it with the potentially more subjective concept of adequate
progress in implementation, which creates a risk for the species. Applica-
tion of this standard suggests that even if the NMFS determines that an
agency's actions are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a
protected species, as long as the agency adopts the suggested alternative
contained in the biological opinion and makes progress in implementation,
it will satisfy its statutory obligations. By declining to include any qualify-
ing language in its ruling, the court left unanswered the question of whether
implementation is enforceable.
In light of the court's stated displeasure with the defendant's lax
compliance efforts,96 it is somewhat surprising that the court required no
more of the defendants, than that they "remain vigilant in their protection
of the species."'  After noting that the defendants had to be "cajoled by
case management initiatives of [the] Court to participate in the procedures
mandated by""8 the ESA, MMPA and NEPA the court still found it
unnecessary to include action-forcing language or strong directives in its
ruling. In light of the precarious state of the Northern Right whale, the
court's decision not to force implementation of the plan could put the
species at even greater risk.9 Congress clearly stated that species conserva-
agency's duty to consult ... does not divest it of discretion to make a final decision that it
has taken all necessary action to insure that its actions will not jeopardize the continued
existence of an endangered species." Id. (quoting Roosevelt Campobello International Park
Commission v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (1's Cir.
1982)).
94. See Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 597.
95. See The Endangered Species Act § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3) (1994).
96. See Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at app. 610 (the court noted the defendants'
"dilatoriness and neglect in initiating mandated procedures" and denied their motion for
summary judgment); See also id. at app. 608 (stating that the grant of summary judgment
"does not constitute endorsement of defendants' belated compliance").
97. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at 608.
98. Id.
99. See Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, 968-70 (D. Mass. 1996) (discussing the
populations and behavioral patterns of various whale species in Massachusetts).
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tion is of the highest priority" and commanded that agencies develop and
implement recovery plans to insure that conservation is achieved.'O
Congress provided the statutory mandate, but it is up to the courts to
enforce it. Because the statute does not impose any time constraints on
implementation, the "progress in implementation" standard does not afford
sufficient protection for Federally protected species."o
B. The Court Declined to Find Violation of the Takings Prohibition
Although the Coast Guard has admittedly killed two Northern Right
whales in violation of the ESA and MM4PA, it has neither applied for, nor
received the requisite permit from the NMFS.' 3 In its defense, the Coast
Guard asserts that the NMFS indicated that it would not likely issue an
MMPA "small take" permit authorizing any amount of vessel collisions
with Northern Right whales because the severely depleted state of the
population would prevent the requisite finding that the takes would have a
"negligible impact" on the species." 4
The First Circuit's standard for injunctive relief is whether the activity
has "actually harmed the species or if continued will actually, as opposed
to potentially, cause harm to the species."' 5 The defendants admit that if
the Coast Guard's activities were to continue, the evidence presented by
Strahan would be sufficient to meet this standard, but assert that those
takings did not occur while the present whale protection programs were in
place." Instead of focusing on this issue, the court was persuaded by the
Coast Guard's position, that the proper question was whether Strahan
showed a "reasonable likelihood of future whale strikes by Coast Guard
vessels."' 7
100. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
101. See The Endangered Species Act §§ 4(f), 7, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(f), 1536 (1994).
102. The recovery plan does not mandate any actions, at any specific time, but rather
presents a guideline for obtaining future goals. Oregon Natural Resource Council v. Turner,
863 F. Supp. 1277, 1284 (D. Or. 1994). Because the ESA does not include any time limits
for the preparation or implementation of a recovery plan, it is difficult to determine whether
delay is unreasonable. Id.
103. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. at app. 624.
104. Id. at app. 612 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §1371(a)(5)(A)(i)).
105. Id. at 600 (quoting American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 166 (1' Cir. 1993)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at app. 625.
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Because the Coast Guard was so resistant to applying for a small take
permit, the court, in the original suit, found that there was "sufficient
evidence to justify an order for initiation of an MMPA small take permit
application to 'compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed."" 08 In its 1995 decree, the court also stated that, "[a] declaratory
judgment may ultimately prove necessary to disabuse the Coast Guard of
its mistaken understanding of the unequivocal message of the ESA."' The
court further believed that, depending on the outcome of the consultation
process, "[a] permanent injunction also may be required to prevent Right
whale incidental takings.""'
In the subject decision, the court seems to have backed down consider-
ably, affording the agency generously broad discretion, despite the fact that
no recovery plan has been implemented to insure the continued preserva-
tion and conservation of the protected whales. The court's refusal to issue,
as requested, a declaratory judgment that the three prior takings that
resulted from Coast Guard vessel strikes constituted violations of the
takings prohibitions of the ESA and MMPA is puzzling."' In granting yet
another motion for summary judgment for the defendants, the court
appeared to be glossing over Strahan's numerous motions, perhaps not
giving each one full consideration.
Ruling that injunctive relief was not warranted, the court found that, "if
implemented, the protective measures in the APLMR and the 1996 Biologi-
cal Opinion will insure.., that future takings will not occur.'," 2 The
deficiency of this reasoning is that the recovery plan has not been imple-
mented, and furthermore, there is no time limit on its implementation. The
court's decision to grant summary judgments for the defendants does not
appear to be sufficiently supported by the rationale and statements con-
tained within the opinion. Alternatively, the court perhaps could have used
section 7(a)(1) to force implementation of the recovery plan.
108. Id. at app. 627 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994)).
109. l at app. 626.
110. l
111. See id. at 600.
112. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
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C. Use of the Section 7(a)(1) Conservation Mandate as an
Action-Forcing Provision
The Coast Guard's emphasis on the importance of its operations is
misplaced, because it was Congress's clear intent "to require agencies to
afford first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered
species," and the omission of any qualifying language "reveals a conscious
decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the 'primary
missions' of federal agencies."'1 3 Although Congress intended that endan-
gered species be afforded the "highest of priorities,"".14 the court effectively
made the ESA's conservation mandate take a back seat to the Coast
Guard's "primary missions." This is reflected in the opinion, when the
court, after acknowledging that, if strictly construed, section 7(a)(1) "could
require the Coast Guard to cease all operations along the Atlantic Coast,"
determined that such an order would not be appropriate." 5 The court
undoubtedly based this determination on public safety concerns, however,
it is possible that section 7(a)(1) could have been used to impose court-
ordered implementation, in place of an injunction." 6
Under section 7(a)(1), the agency has an affirmative duty to bring
endangered species to the point at which they may be removed from
protected status. 17  If properly understood to mean that the duty to
113. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978). Under the ESA, "the
balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in favor of protected species."
National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington Northern, 23 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9"h Cir. 1994).
Congress's concern over the potential risk of losing endangered species to extinction was
reflected in a 1973 Report of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on
H.R. 37: "From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interest of mankind
to minimize the losses of genetic variations ... They are keys to puzzles which we cannot
solve, and may provide answers to questions which we have not yet learned to ask." H.R.
REP. No. 93-412, at 5 (1973). In its Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill opinion the Supreme
Court stated that Congress made a conscious decision to give endangered species priority
over the "primary missions" of federal agencies, and that section 7 would at times require
agencies to alter ongoing activities in order to meet the goals of the Act. Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 185-86.
114. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 174.
115. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 601 (D. Mass. 1997).
116. See generally, J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act:
Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve
Species, 25 ENvTL. L. 1107 (1995); see also Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A
New Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1, 58-77
(1996).
117. See The Endangered Species Act, § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C.§§ 1531(b), 1536(a)(1)
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conserve" imposes the duty to implement recovery plans, section 7(a)(1)
has the potential for use as an action-forcing provision. It could be used as
aprod to compel agencies to implementpolicies and programs thatpromote
species conservation.
The provisions of the ESA must be read in concert. Section 2(c)
identifies conservation as a primary purpose of the statute: "It is further
declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments and
agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species,
and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this
chapter."' 19
Section 3(3) defines "conservation" as recovery of species, or specifi-
cally, "the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring
any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary."' 20
Section 4(f) offers the recovery plan as a means of detailing how to
conserve species, clearly stating that "[tihe Secretary shall develop and
implement [recovery] plans for the conservation and survival of... species
listed pursuant to this chapter."
121
Finally, section 7(a)(1) ties all of these provisions together by imposing
a conservation mandate, requiring that all federal agencies "shall... utilize
their authority in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out
programs for the conservation of... species listed pursuant to section
[4]. ' ' " The ESA's conservation mandate can be best promoted by linking
it to the recovery plans.
(1994). Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered, the NMFS "must do far more
than merely avoid elimination of [the] protected species. It must bring these species back
from the brink so that they may be removed from the protected class." Defenders of Wildlife
v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977).
118. The ESA requires all federal agencies to take affirmative action for the purpose of
conserving endangered species, by utilizing their authority to achieve the purpose of the act.
The Endangered Species Act § 4 (f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994).
119. IM § 2(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1).
120. IM § 3(3), § 1532(3).
121. IM § 4(0, § 1533(f).
122. Id. § 7(a)(1), § 1536(a)(1).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the duty to conserve
species is an affirmative mandate that cannot be overridden by or neglected
because of agencies' "primary missions."' 3 Although the court based its
finding of "no likelihood of future takings" on the assumption that the
recovery plan would be implemented, it declined to take any enforcement
measures to insure that implementation would occur within a reasonable
time frame. Allowing the defendants' primary missions to take precedence
over ESA substantive mandates, the court left enforcement of recovery
planning fully within the discretion of the defendants.
Since section 7(a)(1) requires all federal agencies to "conserve"
endangered species, and since the ESA defines "conservation" in terms of
species recovery, it follows that the recovery plan may be a powerful
mandate for agency action. If the concept of recovery is relevant for
interpreting other provisions of the ESA, it must also be relevant for
interpreting the "duty to conserve." Whether the balance between enforce-
able procedural duties to prepare recovery plans and unenforceable
recovery plan requirements is adequate to conserve endangered species
remains an open question.
123. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978).
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